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1 Introduction
The interaction between learning at the individual level and the trajectory of a population over time
is fundamental to our understanding of linguistic change. Here we use game theory as a mathe-
matical framework for formulating and testing hypotheses about this interaction. We formalize two
hypotheses regarding the spread of vowel mergers and use them to derive the proportion of merged
in-migrants that would precipitate a merger in a previously non-merged speech community.
The first hypothesis stems from Herold’s (1990) conjecture that mergers spread due to contact
between merged speakers and non-merged hearers. Merged speakers do not use a phonemic distinc-
tion to differentiate meanings, but non-merged hearers rely on the distinction as a semantic cue. The
misunderstandings caused by this mismatch lead non-merged learners to abandon the distinction.
We will refer to this hypothesis as merger-by-misunderstanding.
The second hypothesis stems from Trudgill’s (1986) supposition that accommodation plays
a central role in contact-induced changes, and the observation that contact systematically favors
mergers. If learners abide by the simple maxim “talk like others talk” (Keller, 1994), then this
reveals an asymmetry in identifying how others actually talk. A tendency to misidentify non-merged
speakers leads non-merged learners to abandon the distinction. We will refer to this hypothesis as
merger-by-misidentification.
In the next section we provide a brief overview of game theory and offer a general characteriza-
tion of the conditions for merger. With this more abstract criterion in place, we spell out the details
of two models based on the hypotheses and derive concrete predictions. We test these predictions
against the spread of the low-back merger along the Rhode Island-Massachusetts border (Johnson,
2010). In light of these results, we consider the impact of social network structures on both models.
Finally, we conclude with a brief discussion of our results and avenues for future research.
2 Game Theory
A game is a mathematical structure that represents the decisions made by individual agents when
the outcome depends on the decisions of others. As an intuitive example, consider two drivers
approaching each other on the road. Both prefer avoiding a collision, so they do best when they
drive on the complementary sides of the road. Crucially, each driver’s decision depends on the
other’s. We can also think of the interaction in a community. If everyone else drives on one side, an
individual does best by also driving on the right.
In game-theoretic terminology, each player must choose between the strategy of driving on the
left or the right. The drivers’ choices yield the outcome of the game. Each player has a utility
function which expresses her preferences over these outcomes. Presumably, people prefer avoiding
car accidents over not. In a larger community we can think of how well an individual does by driving
on one side or the other given how everyone else behaves. An individual’s expected utility expresses
how well she does on average. Uncontroversially, individuals act to bring about their preferred
outcomes. That is, they act so as to maximize their expected utilities. However, each individual’s
efforts to maximize her own expected utility are influenced by others’ efforts, and vice versa.
This same interdependence can be found in language given how it is learned and used. That
is, while children acquire language from the linguistic input of caretakers, the process of language
learning continues as children come into contact with and reorient towards the patterns of the wider
speech community (Payne, 1976). For most children, this occurs through introduction into a peer
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group at school. In this case, each child is influenced by the linguistic input from her peers. But, in
turn, she provides linguistic input for her peers. In this sense, language learning can be conceived of
as a game. The actions of each individual learner affect everyone else, and vice versa.
Given our goal of understanding when mergers occur, we can be more specific about the com-
ponents of the game. In doing so, we make the following assumptions. First, there are strategies
corresponding to the behaviors of either maintaining or abandoning a phonemic distinction, which
we will call D and M, Individuals either maintain the distinction in both perception and production,
or abandon it in both perception and production.1 Second, as in acquisition, learners only receive
feedback as hearers. In those rare cases where learners actually receive feedback as speakers, it is
ignored or irrelevant (Brown and Hanlon, 1970; Hirsh-Pasek et al., 1984). Third, acting to maxi-
mize expected utility does not involve conscious deliberation. Indeed, a variety of implicit learning
dynamics are appropriate for the case of language (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998).
So, if agents act to maximize expected utility, then mergers occur just when the expected utility
of the merged strategy, EU(M), exceeds that of the non-merged strategy, EU(D). These expected
utilities, in turn, depend on the composition of the speech community as a whole: hearers will
receive some input from merged and non-merged speakers. Let p be the proportion of merged
individuals in the population, and (1− p) the proportion of non-merged individuals. Where EUMD
represents the expected utility of a non-merged hearer when interacting with a merged speaker, and
EUDD the expected utility when interacting with a non-merged speaker, we can express EU(D) as
the following.
EU(D) = pEUMD +(1− p)EUDD (1)
We can do the same for EU(M), where EUMM represents the expected utility of a merged hearer
when interacting with a merged speaker, and EUDM the expected utility when interacting with a
non-merged speaker.
EU(M) = pEUMM +(1− p)EUDM (2)
We are interested when one exceeds the other.
EU(M)> EU(D) (3)
Which allows us to specify the conditions where a merger will occur according to the proportion of
merged individuals in the population:
p >
EUDD −EUDM
EUMM +EUDD −EUMD −EUDM
(4)
This is just a general expression of the threshold for merger. The value of the threshold depends
entirely on how we define strategies and preferences over outcomes. Once we provide the definitions
we will have a prediction. We now turn our attention to providing two such sets of definitions.
3 Models
3.1 Merger-by-misunderstanding
Mergers lead to homophony, homophony to ambiguities, and ambiguities to an increase in the prob-
ability of misunderstandings. This line of reasoning suggests that maintaining a distinction will be
the better strategy. However, as noted above, there are conditions that render the opposite true. For
example, Herold (1990) suggests that mergers spread due to errors in interpretation made by non-
merged hearers in contact with merged speakers, and that ceasing to rely on a phonemic distinction
as a cue for a semantic distinction might actually decrease the rate of misunderstandings.
1The phenomenon of near-mergers (Labov et al., 1991) demonstrates that perception and production are
indeed dissociable. This is a simplifying, but useful assumption.
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The first part of this conjecture is overwhelmingly borne out in a corpus of naturally occurring
misunderstandings (Labov, 1994). Misunderstandings almost always occur between merged speak-
ers and non-merged hearers. Yet, it seems implausible that such misunderstandings occur frequently
enough to prompt learners to adopt a new strategy. The corpus consists of hundreds of misunder-
standings, but these were gathered over several decades. The second part of this conjecture depends
entirely on what it is that merged speakers actually do.
Drawing from psycholinguistic evidence, Yang (2009) develops a compelling model that ad-
dresses both these points. First, misunderstandings need not rise to the level of conscious awareness
to affect learning. Small delays in processing, akin to garden paths, can be taken as a proxy for the
utility of a strategy. The more delays a strategy incurs, the lower its expected utility. Second, merg-
ers render minimal pairs homophonous. Results from homophone processing suggests that merged
hearers will assume the more frequent interpretation of homophonous pairs (Bonin and Fayol, 2002).
Moreover, higher level information does not allow for disambiguation. Boland and Blodgett (2001)
show that this frequency effect overwhelms syntactic information, and Swinney (1979) demonstrates
that contextual information is only available much later on in processing.
These results can be thought of straightforwardly as a signaling game (Lewis, 1969).2 Signaling
games take place between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes some state of the world,
sends a signal to a receiver, and the receiver then takes some action given this signal. In the case
of language, a speaker has some intended meaning that he wants to convey, he chooses a word to
say, and the hearer interprets it. The outcome of the game depends on how speakers signal their
meaning, and how hearers interpret those signals. To define the strategies employed by merged and
non-merged individuals, we adopt the following notation. In what follows we will be concerned
with the use and interpretation of minimal pairs affected by the low-back merger. Let t iO and t
i
A be the
frequencies of the words containing /O/ and /A/ in the ith minimal pair. Let TO = ∑i t iO and TA = ∑i t
i
A
be the sum of the frequencies of the words containing the different phonemes. Let T = TO +TA be
the sum of the frequencies of all the words concerned. Let miO and m
i
A be the phonetic forms for non-
merged speakers of the ith minimal pair. More generally, let mO and mA represent the phonetic forms
of the two vowels for non-merged speakers. Finally, let ε textipaA be the probability of mistaking mA
for mO, and εO be the probability of mistaking mO for mA (e.g., Peterson and Barney (1952)).
We can now define the strategies for merged and non-merged individuals. For each minimal
pair, a non-merged speaker will use distinct forms for the two different meanings, whereas a merged
speaker will only use one. That is, a non-merged speaker will condition his message on the state,
sending miO if intending meaning t
i
O, and m
i
A if intending meaning t
i
A. A merged speaker will send
a single message in both states. Without loss of generality, we will assume that merged speakers
always use miO. A non-merged hearer will condition her action on the message received. If she hears
miA she will interpret as the speaker meaning t
i
A. If she hears m
i
O she will interpret it as the speaker
meaning t iO. This process is not without the possibility of error. Occasionally one signal will be
mistaken for another. In contrast, merged hearers ignore any differences in the message. Regardless
of whether they receive miA or m
i
O, they assume the speaker meant the more frequent of the two
possible meanings.
We are now in a position to calculate how well these strategies do when paired together. The
expected utility of a non-merged hearer can be calculated as follows. When paired with a non-
merged speaker, the hearer will be able to recover the intended meaning of the speaker, without
any delays and additional processing costs, when the message is perceived correctly. Whether the
word is in TA or TO, errors will only be made when the message is misperceived. These values are
normalized by the total frequency of the words involved.
EUDD =
TA(1− εA)+TO(1− εO)
T
(5)
When paired with a merged speaker, a non-merged hearer will not do so well. Again, assuming
2This is a reformulation of Yang’s model modulo the assumption that learning under a Bush and Mosteller
(1951) linear reward penalty scheme a winner-take-all dynamic applies. At some point the learner simply
assumes the more likely of the two options. It is not clear why such a process should occur, nor when it should
take place. Here we obtain the same results without this stipulation and the resulting conceptual difficulty.
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that merged speakers only ever use mO. This means that whenever words from TA are intended, the
hearer will make an error of interpretation, except in case of an error in perception.
EUMD =
TA(εO)+TO(1− εO)
T
(6)
Without knowing anything at all about the various frequencies we can note an important asymmetry
between how non-merged hearers fare. If error rates are fairly low, as we would expect them to
be, then non-merged hearers always do worse against merged speakers than against non-merged
speakers. This captures Herold’s intuition that it is the interaction with merged speakers that causes
problems for non-merged hearers.
The expected utility of merged hearers can be calculated as follows. As noted above, evidence
from homophone processing suggests that the more frequent of the pair is assumed. Let max(t iA, t
i
O)
yield the meaning in the minimal pair with the maximum frequency. If merged hearers treat both
merged and non-merged speakers alike, then the expected utility of a merged receiver can be ex-
pressed as follows.
EUDM = EUMM =
∑i max(t iA, t
i
O)
T
(7)
We have now specified all the components of the model, which we will use for the actual calculations
of the threshold for merger in Section 4.
But, before moving on, we pause to note several general properties of this model of merger-by-
misunderstanding. To do so, we make the simplifying assumption that error rates are roughly equal
(ε : εA ≈ εO), which allows us to represent the threshold as a linear function of a merged hearers
expected utility, EUDM = EUMM , where γ = TAT (1−2ε).
p >
(1− ε)−EUMM
γ
(8)
First, mergers are always possible, even in the special case where error rates are negligible (ε ≈ 0).
In this case the threshold is then given by p > T−∑i max(t
i
A,t
i
O)
TA
, which is always less than 1. Second,
as the asymmetry between maximum and minimum in each pair grows, so does EUMM . The more
lopsided the pairs become, the lower the threshold for merger becomes. For situations of contact
between merged and non-merged dialects, this means that asymmetric contrasts are more susceptible
to merger. Third, taken even further, this also gives the conditions for when a contrast could be
sufficiently lopsided for the actuation of a merger in the absence of dialect contact (1−ε = EUMM).
This is suggestive in light of the work reported in Wedel et al. (2012), where, in a survey of 482
phonemic contrasts, they find that the number of balanced minimal pairs — minimal pairs where the
ratio between the minimum and the maximum frequency of the pair is close to 1 — is a fairly good
predictor of whether a merger has occurred or not.
3.2 Merger-by-misidentification
Mergers lead to homophony, homophony to ambiguities, and ambiguities might not matter for much.
That is, misunderstandings might be irrelevant in light of more fundamental pressures to “talk like
others talk” (Keller, 1994). Trudgill posits that, in cases of dialect contact, speakers accommodate
to each other “by reducing the dissimilarities between their speech patterns and adopting features
from each other’s speech” (1986, 39).
While this supposition is, in a certain sense, undeniable, it misses a crucial aspect of change.
That is, accommodation undoubtedly permeates linguistic interactions at various levels of struc-
ture (e.g., Natale (1975); Gregory (1990); Pardo (2006); Brennan and Clark (1996); Branigan et al.
(2000)). But, accommodation presupposes the ability to identify when our own speech differs from
that of others. If mergers are favored in cases of dialect contact, then there must be some asymmetry
in identifying how it is that others actually talk.
Accommodation can be taken as a coordination game. That is, agents prefer to coordinate their
behavior with others. As in the case of driving conventions, an individual does best by coordinating
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her behavior with that of the population as a whole. However, in the case of language conventions,
everything depends on the evidence that a learner receives that her interlocutors are using one strat-
egy or another. To define the strategies employed by merged and non-merged individuals, we use
the same notation as in the previous model.
Speaker behavior is as in the previous model: non-merged speakers condition their message on
the intended meaning, whereas merged speakers do not. However, here we assume that hearers can
recover the speaker’s intended meaning. Crucially, what is at issue is not what is said, but rather, how
it is said. That is, coordination is a matter of having the same meaning-form mappings. For example,
the word cot from an O-merged speaker will be taken as evidence as a failure to coordinate by a non-
merged hearer. The same would hold if the roles of speaker and hearer were reversed. The important
thing is whether the hearer would have used the same form given the intended meaning. Again, this
process is not without error. There is some probability of mistakes between the two forms. The
important thing is how often a hearer has evidence that a speaker shares the same meaning-form
mappings.
We are now in a position to calculate how well these strategies do when paired together. The
expected utility of a non-merged hearer can be calculated as follows. When paired with a non-
merged speaker, the hearer always has evidence of successful coordination except in those cases of
misperception.
EUDD =
TA(1− εA)+TO(1− εO)
T
(9)
When paired with a merged speaker, a merged hearer does not do as well. When words from TA are
intended the hearer only thinks the speaker shares the same meaning-form mapping when the signal
is misperceived. When words from TO are intended they have evidence of successful coordination,
less errors in perception.
EUMD =
TA(εO)+TO(1− εO)
T
(10)
The expected utility of a merged hearer can be calculated as follows. When paired with a non-
merged speaker, a merged hearer is in a parallel situation to when the roles are reversed. When
words from TA are intended the hearer only has evidence of successful coordination when the signal
is misperceived. When words from TO are intended they have evidence of successful coordination,
less errors in perception.
EUDM =
TA(εA)+TO(1− εO)
T
(11)
When paired with a merged speaker, a merged hearer always has evidence of successful coordination
regardless of whether the word came from TA or TO.
EUMM =
TA +TO
T
(12)
We now have all the components of the model, which will be used for calculations of the threshold
for merger in Section 4.
We pause to note several properties of this model of merger-by-misidentification. To do so,
we make the simplifying assumption that error rates are equal, which allows to represent the corre-
sponding threshold in a compact manner, where γ = TAT (1−2ε), as above.
p >
γ
2γ + ε
(13)
First, in the case where error rates are negligible (ε ≈ 0), a majority is required for merger to occur,
exactly as we would expect. Thus, any tendency for merger requires some non-negligible error rate.
Second, when the error rate is non-negligible (ε > 0), the impact of the error rate is determined by
the frequency distribution. That is, the more lopsided the distribution, the greater the impact the error
rate has. The smaller TA is, the more likely that a merger will occur resulting in /O/. The larger TA is,
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the less likely that a merger is to occur resulting in /O/. In fact, the larger TA is, the more likely that a
merger is to occur resulting in /A/. For situations of contact, we expect that contrasts that are more
lopsided, in terms of the total frequency of the words containing the two phonemes, are more likely
to undergo merger. Third, conditions for actuation only occur vacuously in this model (γ = 0). That
is, these conditions obtain just when there is no semantic distinction to be had, or when the forms
are perfectly confusable. However, the actuation of mergers may be attributable to other causes. For
example, based economic and demographic evidence, Herold (1990) argues that the actuation of the
low-back merger in Eastern Pennsylvania was brought about by an influx of foreign-born anthracite
coal miners. It is safe to assume that an adult would not be able to learn the distinction if it were not
already present in his or her native language, at least, given that merged children older than fourteen
without a native distinction categorically fail to learn it (Chambers, 1992). These foreign-born adults
would have provided the linguistic input for their own children, who would have eventually come
into contact with peers. While demographic data is not conclusive as to native dialects, foreign-
born or first-generation individuals constituted the majority in the towns where the merger occurred.
Thus, contact, in some broader sense, might always be the source of actuation.
4 Evaluation
Up to this point, we have done two things. First, we stated a general formula for calculating the
threshold for merger. Second, we formalized two hypotheses about the details of this general for-
mula. Now, we are in a position to make the calcuations for each model that yield the proportion of
merged individuals sufficient to bring about a merger. We should note that the predictions made by
the two models are generally distinct. Thus, the two models can be taken as competing explanations.
These predictions, in turn, can then be compared to the documented spread of the merger.
The thresholds for merger were computed for both models over a range error rates, from no er-
rors to the case where the two messages are perfectly confusable. We used minimal pair frequencies
from a tokenized version of the Wortschatz Corpus (Biemann et al., 2007).3 Minimal pairs where
one member did not appear at least ten times in the corpus were excluded from the calculations.
Given that this eliminates low frequency pairs it increases the threshold for the model of merger-
by-misunderstanding, but leaves the model of merger-by-misidentification largely untouched. The
results of all the calculations can be seen in Figure 1 where the horizontal and the vertical axes
represent the error rates εA and εO, respectively. The threshold for each of these combinations is
represented as a color. The darker the color the lower the threshold, the lighter the color the higher
the threshold. Both models yield their maximum thresholds when there are no errors: the maxima
are p = .27 for the model of merger-by-misunderstanding, and p = .5 for the model of merger-by-
misidentification.
Johnson (2010) documents the spread of the low-back merger along the border between Mas-
sachussets and Rhode Island. The dialect boundary between merged Massachussets and non-merged
Rhode Island has been historically stable, despite contact between adults from both sides. Johnson
argues that the spread of the merger is due to an influx of merged children into previously distinct
areas. In South Attleboro, MA the merger went to completion within a few years starting in roughly
1990. In Seekonk, MA the merger went to completion within a few years starting in roughly 2000.
Johnson estimates the proportion of merged children at the inception of the merger to have been
roughly 50% in South Attleboro and 20% in Seekonk. Assuming that error rates are fairly low
(ε < .1), as suggested by work on vowel confusability (Peterson and Barney, 1952), both models
find support in these empirical thresholds. That is, the model of merger-by-misunderstanding pre-
dicts a threshold of 20% and the model of emphmerger-by-misidentification predicts a threshold of
3The minimal pairs used, with frequencies from lowest to highest, are: pod (24), pawed (11); fond (1318),
fawned (12); bock (20), balk (16); sot (20), sought (1703); collar (403), caller (21); clod (23), clawed (238);
hock (25), hawk (127); knotty (25), naughty (195); sod (30), sawed (37); pond (258), pawned (31); yon (67),
yawn (36); cot (39), caught (2444); bot (52), bought (995); nod (180), gnawed (53); Otto (67), auto (260);
odd (830), awed (80); stock (1456), stalk (105); rot (109), wrought (336); moll (188), maul (121); knot (226),
naught (156); Don (1052), Dawn (736).
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Figure 1: Threshold for merger for model of merger-by-misidentification (left) and merger-by-
misunderstanding. (right)
roughly 50%.
What are we to make of these results? We certainly cannot posit that learners behave differently
in different locations. So, the fact that there are two distinct thresholds is problematic for both
models. This follows from the fact that both models are deterministic. That is, given a set of
lexical frequencies and error rates, each model predicts a unique threshold. If either model has
any possibility of accounting for the data, we must posit some difference in the components of the
model. That is, we must consider whether the frequencies or error rates can vary from location to
location. We consider these two options in turn.
Lexical frequencies are drawn from a corpus, which is taken as representative of the general lin-
guistic environment of speakers. Obviously, individual speakers have unique histories of linguistic
input. Thus, we might think of different distributions over experiences in a population. However, it
is not clear why any such experiences should vary so widely across communities. Accounting for
the differences across the two communities in this manner would essentially be an appeal to chance
factors. That is, the children in South Attleboro would somehow have had to have heard more of
the less frequent of all the minimal pairs. Or, in the other direction, the children of Seekonk would
have had to have heard many more tokens of words with meanings from the set TO. At best, these
considerations push the difference between the two communities further into the mysterious.
Error rates seem a more promising route in explaining the difference between the two com-
munities. It is uncontroversial that size of the distinction between two categories may vary with
location. Further, it is reasonable to assume that the size of the distinction factors into error rates;
the smaller the distinction, the larger the error rates. Note that this approach adjudicates in favor of
the model of merger-by-misidentification. That is, there are error rates that supply both the South
Attleboro (ε ≈ .1) and Seekonk (ε ≈ .3) thresholds. The maximum threshold value of the model
of merger-by-misunderstanding is less than the South Attleboro threshold, regardless of the error
rate. However, we would need convincing evidence that the error rate would have been higher in
Seekonk, thus lowering the threshold for merger. That is, we would need evidence that the vowels
approximated each other much more closely in Seekonk than in South Attleboro.
A third option for exploring the explanatory power of the two models lies in relaxing our as-
sumptions about the structure of interactions between individuals. Thus far our models have carried
the implicit assumption that the likelihood of encountering an individual with a particular strategy
is the proportion of individuals using that strategy. In the next section, we relax this assumption and
consider the consequences for the two models.
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Figure 2: Mean stable state for various proportions of merged speakers.
5 Network Structure
Real networks are rarely uniform; individuals occupy unique social niches. Here we explore the
effects of network structure by constructing networks via preferential attachment (Barabási and Al-
bert, 1999). The resulting networks consist of a few highly connected nodes, whereas most nodes
have only a few connections. This parallels a network where a few individuals are highly-connected,
whereas most are more peripheral. A few highly-connected individuals may exert an outsized in-
fluence on the population. In this case, they will play a greater than average part in the linguistic
environment of others. There are two questions we wish to answer. First, can we explain the
threshold in South Attleboro by the model of merger-by-misunderstanding? That is, can 50% of
the population be placed in a network to only have the effect of 20%? Second, can we explain the
threshold in Seekonk by the model of merger-by-misidentification? That is, can 20% of the popu-
lation be placed in a network to have the effect of 50%? As a first step towards answering these
questions we performed the following simulations.
We constructed networks of 500 agents by preferential attachment and simulated the end state of
the population. Each agent began with an initial state, either non-merged (0) or merged (1). Merged
agents were placed into the network by three conditions. They were either placed in the most-
connected positions, placed randomly, or placed in the least-connected positions. Agents began by
calculating the proportion of their neighbors wiht the merger. If this proportion exceeded a threshold,
they adopted the merger as well. This process was iterated until no agents changed their state. The
average state of all agents was recorded. We considered multiple values for the threshold and various
proportions of merged speakers. For each proportion of merged speakers we ran the simulation 100
times. The results can be seen in Figure 2.
We are now able to address our two questions. First, we address whether 50% can have the
effect of 20% when the threshold is as predicted by the model of merger-by-misunderstanding.
Looking at the panel in Figure 2 where p = .2, we want to establish several things. For example,
it appears that the effect of 20% varies quite widely with placement in the network. When placed
in the most connected positions, the merger easily spreads. When placed randomly or in the lowest
positions, the merger is not guaranteed to spread. In contrast, if more than 20% of the population is
merged, regardless of placement, the merger spreads. This would seem a good thing, insofar as 50%
can have the same effect as 20%. That is, they can both result in merger. But, this fails to explain
why the merger in South Attleboro occurred when it did. To see why, consider the following. If
the proportion of merged speakers in South Attleboro exceeded 20% at any point prior to 1990,
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then the merger would have begun earlier. The fact that it did not leaves us with two options. It
could be the case that there was a dramatic influx of merged children just prior to 1990. That is,
the proportion went from 20% to 50% in a short period of time. Citing census data, Johnson argues
that such a dramatic demographic change in South Attleboro is unlikely. The only other option is
that the threshold for merger is not as predicted by the model of merger-by-misunderstanding. Thus,
the network structure we have tested suggests that the model of merger-by-misunderstanding cannot
explain both thresholds.
Second, we address whether 20% can have the effect of 50% when the threshold is as predicted
by the model of merger-by-misidentification. Again, consulting Figure 2 in the panel where p = .4,
we want to establish what the effect of 50% is. In this case, it depends on placement. That is,
50% can bring about merger if placed in the most connected positions or randomly, but fail to do
so if placed in the lowest positions. Similarly, 20% can bring about a merger if placed in the most
connected positions, but fail to do so if placed randomly or in the least connected positions. We
might argue that the two different thresholds just reflect different network structures. But, why
should the merged children in South Attleboro occupy less connected positions, and the merged
children in Seekonk more connected positions?
Johnson suggests a possible explanation, albeit speculatively, when considering the social situ-
ation of merged children moving into Seekonk (2010, 203):
The children of families from Greater Boston — especially those who live in new homes
in expensive subdivisions — might have high prestige. A few such children, who happen
to have the merger, might have more influence on their distinct peers.
Of course, we might also think of prestige in terms of connectedness. That is, the merged children
entering Seekonk may be highly connected with their peers. It is an empirical question as to whether
the economic status of one’s parents translates to anything meaningful in terms of social network
status. But, it does not seem unreasonable to think that a higher economic status might afford more
opportunities for engagement with the peer group in both school and extracurricular activities. This
line of reasoning also offers a plausible explanation for the placement of merged children in South
Attleboro. For example, we might suppose that rising housing prices in Boston and the expansion of
commuting would displace those of lower economic means first. Thus, the merged children moving
into South Attleboro before 1990 would not have, on average, occupied more highly connected
positions in their peer networks. This, in turn, would have allowed for the higher observed threshold.
Again, this rests on an assumed correlation between the parents’ economic and a child’s social status.
The effect of social networks can be quite strong. But, we should note that the shape of chil-
dren’s actual social networks is an empirical matter. Here we have merely offered a proof of concept
that such structures can matter. Much more work would need to be done in order to substantiate our
conjectures. However, on the whole we have seen that even these conceptual considerations favor
the model of merger-by-misidentification.
6 Conclusion
We have used game theory to formalize hypotheses regarding the factors that affect the spread of
mergers. We derived conditions for merger-by-misunderstanding and merger-by-misidentification,
and compared the predictions to empirical thresholds. Given the existence of distinct empirical
thresholds, we considered what aspects of the two models could be reasonably varied across loca-
tions. Both error rates and network structure weighed in favor of merger-by-misidentification.
While game theory offers us a powerful framework for exploring how learning impacts language
change, much work remains to be done. We have asked several questions regarding the shape of
social networks and their impact on learning and change. Answering them will be an empirical
matter. More broadly, if all of sound change can be thought of as (conditioned) mergers and splits,
then we have a wealth of evidence at our disposal to continue testing and refining our hypotheses.
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Barabási, Albert-László, and Réka Albert. 1999. Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 286:509–
512.
Biemann, Chris, Gerhard Heyer, Uwe Quasthoff, and Matthias Richter. 2007. The Leipzig corpora collection-
monolingual corpora of standard size. In Proceedings of Corpus Linguistics 2007.
Boland, Julie E., and Allison Blodgett. 2001. Understanding the constraints on syntactic generation: Lexical
bias and discourse congruency effects on eye movements. Journal of Memory and Language 45:391–411.
Bonin, Patrick, and Michel Fayol. 2002. Frequency effects in the written and spoken production of homophonic
picture names. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 14:289–313.
Branigan, Holly, Martin Pickering, and Alexandra Cleland. 2000. Syntactic co-ordination in dialogue. Cogni-
tion 75:B12–25.
Brennan, Susan, and Herb Clark. 1996. Conceptual pacts and lexical choice in conversation. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 22:1482–1493.
Brown, Roger, and Camille Hanlon. 1970. Derivational complexity and order of acquisition in child speech,
11–53. Wiley Online Library.
Bush, Robert R., and Frederick Mosteller. 1951. A mathematical model for simple learning. Psychological
Review 58:312–323.
Chambers, Jack K. 1992. Dialect acquisition. Language 673–705.
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 1998. The theory of learning in games. MIT press.
Gregory, Stanford. 1990. Analysis of fundamental frequency reveals covariation in interview partner’s speech.
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 14:237–251.
Herold, Ruth. 1990. Mechanisms of merger: The implementation and distribution of the low back merger in
Eastern Pennsylvania. Doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.
Hirsh-Pasek, Kathy, Rebecca Treiman, and Maita Schneiderman. 1984. Brown and Hanlon revisited: Mothersrq
sensitivity to ungrammatical forms. Journal of child language 11:81–88.
Johnson, Daniel Ezra. 2010. Stability and Change Along a Dialect Boundary: The Low Vowels of Southeastern
New England. American Dialect Society.
Keller, R. 1994. On language change: The invisible hand in language. Routledge.
Labov, William. 1994. Principles of Linguistic Change: Internal Factors. Oxford: Blackwell.
Labov, William, Mark Karen, and Corey Miller. 1991. Near-mergers and the suspension of phonemic contrast.
Language Variation and Change 3:33–74.
Lewis, David. 1969. Convention. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Natale, Michael. 1975. Convergence of mean vocal intensity in dyadic communication as a function of social
desirability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32:790–804.
Pardo, Jennifer. 2006. On phonetic convergence during conversational interaction. Journal of the Acoustical
Society of America 119:2382–2393.
Payne, Arvilla. 1976. The Acquisition of the Phonological System of a Second Dialect. Doctoral dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania.
Peterson, Gordon E., and Harold L. Barney. 1952. Control methods used in a study of the vowels. Journal of
the Acoustical Society of America 24:175–184.
Swinney, David A. 1979. Lexical access during sentence comprehension:(Re) consideration of context effects.
Journal of verbal learning and verbal behavior 18:645–659.
Trudgill, P. 1986. Dialects in contact. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wedel, Andrew, Scott Jackson, and Abby Kaplan. 2012. Functional load and the lexicon: Evidence that syn-
tactic category and frequency relationships in minimal lemma pairs predict the loss of phoneme contrasts in
language change. Unpublished Manuscript.
Yang, Charles. 2009. Population Structure and Language Change.
Department of Linguistics
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104
cahern@ling.upenn.edu
